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Prerna Singh’s book comes with some trailing glory:  It won the 2016 Woodrow 
Wilson Foundation Award of the American Political Science Association, 
and was also a co-winner of the 2016 Barrington Moore Book Award of the 
American Sociological Association. It deals with some important questions: 
Why do some Indian states have better social service provision and welfare 
outcomes than others? What are the conditions that promote social welfare? 
What best explains the stark variations in educational and health outcomes 
within India? How might it be possible to improve outcomes in laggard states 
such as Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar towards those achieved by Tamil 
Nadu and Kerala?
The comparisons between these three north and two south Indian states 
are well known to economists, public health specialists and educationalists, 
but there are few good explanations out there that try to account for these 
differences. In the field of political economy, one of theseincreasingly 
challengedis that public goods are less likely to be delivered in settings of 
social diversity, as indicated by caste, religion or ethnicity. Singh’s contribution 
to the debate is that “subnational solidarity fosters a sense of collective 
welfare, promotes political awareness and participation, and encourages 
popular monitoring of public goods” (55). “Subnational solidarity” emerges 
if challenger elites choose to develop common symbols such as “common 
history, memories, myths, culture, and language” (30). As a result, dominant 
(national) elites can be cast as an “out-group” against which collective popular 
actions can be mobilised. Such a process can reduce the significance of social 
heterogeneity. Clearly, it is “invented,” in Benedict Anderson’s terms, not a 
result of primordial sentiments. This does, of course, also raise the question of 
whether those dominant elites (perhapsas in Indiaoften located unevenly 
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across the country) can use the same methods by casting foreign outsiders 
in the same terms, and Singh uses the familiar example of the strengthening 
of the welfare state in Britain as a result of the collective identities forged 
during the second World War. But in the Indian context, it also means that 
challenger elites in Uttar Pradesh (for long regarded as the dominant political 
state, not just because of its population, but also because it was a key base of 
the nationalist movement) have found it difficult, if not impossible, to forge 
this kind of subnational solidarity (discussed by the author in Chapter 5). 
Her theory is set out in two versions, one “top-down” and one “bottom-
up.” The top-down model is concerned to spell out how local elites may come 
together and “transcend, but not necessarily abandon, their subgroups” (36). 
As they feel the psychological effects of this identification with subnational 
groups, and experience ethical obligations of this wider community 
membership, they support collective welfare schemes and push for them to 
be included in the policy agenda, leading to progressive social policies. In 
the bottom-up mechanism, collective welfare support from the top facilitates 
emotional arousal, mobilisation by subnational movements, greater political 
consciousness and then greater involvement in public services (37–41).
Singh shows strong correlations between her indicators of subnational 
solidarity, social development expenditures and welfare outcomes (literacy, 
good health indicators, etc.) over time: she accepts that the existence of good 
social policies can help, in their turn, to generate subnational solidarity, but 
argues that the creation of subnational solidarity has come first. This claim is 
supported by a raft of indicators, for example of subnational consciousness 
through linguistic, political mobilisation, the presence or absence of separatist 
movements, and aspects of party politics, across all the larger Indian states from 
1960–2000. A data appendix to Chapter 6 should satisfy the methodological 
purists who might wish to be assured that all the correct statistical tests have 
been carried out.
Not content with her analysis of India, Singh widens her net to look at 
two other cases of subnational solidarityQuebec (249–251), and Scotland 
(251–255). For Quebec, she notes how through the 1960s, politicians began 
to demand that Quebec’s historical distinctiveness, in terms of language and 
religious institutions, should be recognised in more autonomy that would also 
allow its more egalitarian spirit to flourish. Scotland, similarly, has a separate 
history and retains local social institutions in the church, education, law, and 
banking that differ from those in England. Scottish politicians have laboured 
to enhance this sense of separateness, but only really became successful in 
the 1980s and 1990s, when they won increasing levels of regional autonomy. 
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Singh makes great play with how the claim of an egalitarian spirit was used to 
mobilise support, and to the specification of that claim in terms of a stronger 
commitment to a welfare state. But she does not discuss why or how, in practice, 
health and educational indicators for Scotland are not noticeably better than 
those in England, and in some cases, are worse.
There is much to be appreciated in this contribution. Despiteor 
perhaps, for some readers, because ofconsiderable repetition of the main 
arguments, the book is well written and does its best to carry its audience along 
through some complex arguments using statistical modelling. As an example 
of a particular kind of political science (and linked versions of political 
sociology) it is welcome because it attempts to integrate a close historical 
enquiry with the analysis of quantitative datasets. What is not so well handled, 
however, are aspects of the everyday politics of these states. There is, for 
example, no reference to violence on the part of “challenger elites,” as part 
of the everyday political experience of those not included in the subnational 
projectMuslims in Uttar Pradesh, Dalits and Adivasis (neither of whom 
warrant an index entry) in Tamil Nadu or Bihar, for example. Similarly, I am 
not convinced of the effort to link the state-wide indicators to the everyday 
processes through which health and education policies are implemented. As 
Singh notes, “the lack of… systematic data across states over time on citizen 
levels of socio-political consciousness and activism and involvement with 
schools or health centres” makes it impossible directly to testin ways she 
would likethe “bottom-up” version of her theory. There is evidence, but not 
of the kind she is happy to use, on these issues, and it occasionally surfaces, 
as in the use of ethnographic material of her own (relegated to a footnote on 
144) on how local people in Kerala engage with public services, and have 
done so since the 1950s. More use of such material would have provided more 
intuitive feel for how her arguments play out in the everyday, but, perhaps, 
would also have required a much larger or very different book.
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